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The Verdict of Battle: The Law of Victory and the Making of Modern War. By James 
Q. Whitman. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012. Pp. vii, 323. Index. 
 
For evident reasons, scholarship on the law of war has been a growth industry for the past 
two decades. But only recently have legal historians added their voice to the vigorous debates 
that rage from the ivory tower to political fora to the battlefield.1 This is doubtless a laudable 
trend: focusing diverse disciplinary lenses on an issue promotes clarity, creativity, and analytic 
rigor. Still, it is not immediately clear what reflection on the comparatively orderly wars of the 
eighteenth century between monarchs might contribute to current debates, which, for all their 
diversity, tend to revolve around difficulties generated by novel forms of non-state belligerence. 
Begin with the scenario portrayed at the outset of The Verdict of Battle: 
Two armed groups meet in pitched battle. There is a chaotic struggle. Many of the 
combatants are killed. At the end of a conflict lasting a few hours or perhaps an entire 
day, one group flees, or perhaps both do. One group, usually the one that manages to hold 
its ground amid the terror and killing, is deemed the victor. 
How should we think about such an event? (p. 1) 
 
James Q. Whitman, Ford Foundation Professor of Comparative and Foreign Law at Yale Law 
School, offers a remarkably erudite and original answer. He elucidates the sui generis nature of 
pitched battle during what he denotes “the long eighteenth century” (c. 1660-1790) (p. 54), 
recasts the phenomenon to clarify, above all, its distinctly legal significance, and explains its 
evolution and demise in terms that call traditional accounts into serious question. The Verdict of 
Battle concludes with reflections about what this analysis counsels for the modern law of war.  
The Verdict of Battle is in most respects a paragon of legal and historical scholarship. It 
further cements the author’s reputation as one of our most thoughtful, erudite, and creative legal 
historians. The critical dimensions of this review will be commensurately modest: at times, I 
think, the book elides or minimizes evidence of distinct, if related, developments in the complex 
                                                
1 E.g., JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE (2012); MARY L. DUDZIAK, WAR TIME: AN IDEA, ITS HISTORY, ITS 
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history of just war theory and international law, both of which defy reduction to a seamless 
narrative. In part for that reason, The Verdict of Battle’s (albeit limited) polemical dimensions 
often seem misplaced or overstated. After sketching the core arguments, I suggest how and why.  
Three questions frame The Verdict of Battle’s descriptive and normative agenda: “Why 
was it ever possible to limit warfare to the concentrated collective violence of pitched battle? 
Why did the classic pitched battled go into decline in the age of the American Civil War and the 
Franco-Prussian War? Is there anything we can still learn from the battle warfare of the past?” 
(p. 8) To answer them requires inquiry into the sociohistorical nature of the pitched battle, its 
conceptual foundations, and its perception among eighteenth-century contemporaries. 
 Scholars identify three prototypes of premodern land warfare: the pitched battle, the 
siege, and the raid. The latter two refer to variations on the definition of war in Aristotle’s 
Politics, a “brutal hunt for human prey” (p. 26). Armed men attack hapless, often surprised and 
always unarmed, victims (p. 35). Unrestrained violence is the rule. Atrocity is commonplace. 
The comparatively humane and constrained pitched battle, in contrast, is unusual—although, 
intriguingly, also culturally and historically ubiquitous (pp. 6, 28-29). It reached its meridian, 
however, during what many scholars regard as Europe’s “golden age of civilized, enlightened, 
warfare” (p. 55). Orchestrated consensually by monarchs, pitched battles denote orderly conflicts 
between professional soldiers facing one another on a geographically and temporally confined 
battlefield (p. 29). In paradigm, if not always fact, they last a few hours, perhaps a day, 
concluding with retreat, or surrender of the battlefield, by one of the belligerents. The other, for 
that reason, will typically be regarded as the victor (pp. 1, 29), even if its forces sustained more 
casualties or lost the battle along another, equally logical, measure. In short, success and victory 
in pitched battle should be distinguished and need not be coterminous (p. 194). Well-known 
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pitched battles of the era include “Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, Leipzig, and Waterloo” and, 
latterly, “Solferino and Königgrätz” (p. 7).  
Whitman argues that during this time, a pitched battle amounted to a kind of wager, what 
Pufendorf called a “tacit contract of chance” (pp. 52, 77). The wager of battle could, and often 
did, resolve epic legal disputes. Monarchs accepted pitched battle as an appropriate way to 
resolve competing claims to territory, property rights, and dynastic succession. To settle issues of 
this magnitude by a process predicated on the vicissitudes of fortune, pitched battles perforce 
relied on “a widespread, if somewhat mysterious, legal intuition: that it is through taking risks 
that we acquire rights” (p. 82). Yet because of this intuition, during the long eighteenth century, 
war as a brutal hunt for human prey periodically yielded to war as a constrained, rule-governed 
battle that could settle major international disputes (p. 56). This of course begs the question why 
monarchs would relegate epic disputes to what at first blush looks like a roll of the dice. 
It is difficult to do justice in a brief review to the rich answer Whitman defends, which 
synchronously combines history, philosophy, political science, and legal theory. But two points 
merit particular emphasis: first, as high as the stakes were, pitched battles did not threaten (to the 
contrary, they reinforced) the legitimacy of the monarchical state and its Weberian monopoly on 
lawful violence (pp. 226, 247, 249); and second, to an extent modern readers may initially find 
difficult to comprehend, European élites saw the role of luck in warfare as both ineluctable and 
meaningful. A quotation captures the former point well: “The very fact that war counted as a 
legal procedure meant that it could be fought in a procedural, orderly way. If eighteenth century 
rulers had fought . . . what the jurists condemned as ‘wild beast wars,’ their claim to be lawful 
sovereigns would have been weakened” (p. 249). Hence the absence of an eighteenth-century 
European Genghis Khan. The latter contention (about the role of luck) requires the reader to 
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appreciate at least three related dynamics: fortune (1) enabled élites to ascribe the verdict of 
battle to supernatural forces; (2) relieved them of ultimate responsibility for the outcome (just as 
modern international dispute-settlement can offer sovereigns a way to save face); and (3) 
deterred relitigation, so to speak, of the verdict—for one cannot sensibly appeal the result of a 
coin flip (p. 81).  
Pitched battles therefore offered monarchs a measure of both legitimacy and finality in an 
international political and legal order, which, then as now, lacked a centralized authority capable 
of adjudicating among juridically coequal sovereigns. Alone among the prototypes of warfare, 
pitched battles could settle international disputes in a way that, while risky, held out the potential 
for durable verdicts that could confer epic gains. “Frederick could potentially ‘gain a kingdom’ 
in the words of Bodin” (p. 93). Pitched battles, as Pufendorf and Vattel emphasized, incentivized 
“civilized sovereign behavior,” rendering their verdicts “worthy of enhanced diplomatic respect” 
(p. 249). Belligerents, like modern litigants, often (but not always) respected them.  
The jus victoriae, or law of victory, connected to pitched battle also answered crucial 
questions that we regrettably tend to neglect in the modern law of war: “first, how do we know 
who won? and second, what do you win by winning?” (p. 10).2 The Verdict of Battle argues that 
the answers to these questions—for example, that one belligerent retreated and vindication of the 
other’s territorial claim, respectively—qualified as law, not merely custom or the like. If so, it is 
surely correct that “[o]dd though it may sound, we cannot do satisfying military history without 
doing a bit of philosophy of law” (p. 180). Hersch Lauterpacht’s famous dictum comes to mind 
in this regard: “if international law is, in some ways, at the vanishing point of law, the law of war 
                                                
2 For one scholar’s reflection on these issues in the context of modern warfare carried out by liberal 
democracies, see Gabriella Blum, The Fog of Victory, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 391 (2013). 
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is, perhaps even more conspicuously, at the vanishing point of international law.”3 Yet as 
Whitman argues, correctly in my opinion, it is law. War is not massacre.4  It is “not just violence; 
it is a legal act with legal meaning, and that legal meaning is of great symbolic importance for 
the organization of society” (pp. 154-55). 
Reciprocity is almost always an indispensable component of the law of war,5 and pitched 
battle is no exception (p. 191). Yet we can only understand the eighteenth-century jus victoriae 
by looking beyond reciprocity to more subtle dynamics that were equally at work (p. 192). 
Referencing H.L.A. Hart’s critique of John Austin, Whitman emphasizes in this regard that most 
legal rules influence conduct not only, or even primarily, by threatening sanctions. Law includes 
rules and principles that confer power and “promise at least potential advantages,” incentivizing 
obedience. Conversely, it creates risks for those who violate the rules: gains thereby derived may 
be ephemeral or marred by illegitimacy, for example. So too, Whitman notes with reference to 
Holmes’s “bad man”—one who simply “asks whether he is likely to profit or suffer by following 
the rules” and ignores them if he thinks he can with impunity—the existence of an applicable 
legal rule, mutatis mutandis, renders compliance with that rule beneficial and its disregard 
hazardous; and within the social context of eighteenth-century Europe, “[p]remodern military 
commanders were a class of Holmesian bad men if there ever was one” (pp. 190-91). Nor does 
the lack of categorical obedience to the rules of pitched battle cast doubt on their legal status, for 
“[i]t is in the nature of legal rules that they are never uniformly obeyed” (p. 190).  
By underscoring the symbolic force and legitimacy of fortune in premodern Europe (pp. 
81-83), Whitman renders comprehensible why belligerents might acknowledge that it conferred 
                                                
3 Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, 1952 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L. L. 360, 382. 
4 Robert D. Sloane, Prologue to a Voluntarist War Convention, 106 MICH. L. REV. 443, 444-45 (2007).  
5 See generally MARK OSIEL, THE END OF RECIPROCITY (2009). 
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authority on the outcome. The wager of battle vindicated the verdict (p. 81). This is not to say, he 
hastens to add, that élites relegated vital issues like dynastic succession or territorial claims to 
dumb luck. Pitched battles were “mixed games of chance” (p. 91, emphasis added). Human effort 
and resources (technology, strategy, the quantity and quality of a sovereign’s forces, and the like) 
considerably influenced the outcome but did not alone determine it.  
Insofar as the jus victoriae of pitched battle constituted the law of war in the long 
eighteenth century, then, notwithstanding the contemporaneous existence of theological, 
chivalric, natural law, and other antecedents to modern international humanitarian law (IHL), the 
operational law of war had little if anything to do with its focus today: limiting resort to war (jus 
ad bellum) and needless suffering (jus in bello). That observation is doubtless true but alone 
unremarkable. Yet because the pitched battle limited armed conflict in time and space, it 
incidentally insulated civilians from bloodshed and reduced the scope of war (pp. 4-5):  “Wars 
with limited aims tend by their nature to be limited wars” (p. 169). It may therefore be of 
normative and not only historical interest to ask what conditions enabled pitched battles and why 
they gradually receded. 
Whitman illustrates their demise by reference to momentous nineteenth-century conflicts 
on each side of the Atlantic, the Franco-Prussian and U.S. Civil Wars (p. 211), which also show 
that pitched battles did not vanish overnight (p. 7). For even in the latter nineteenth century, 
wealthy “battle tourists” expected them. They set up amphitheaters nearby, replete with servants 
and picnic baskets, to enjoy the anticipated spectacle of a pitched battle as one might a boxing 
match (p. 210). Yet they found that pitched battles failed to deliver the “quick and decisive 
resolution” that typified early “open confrontation on the battlefield” (id.).  The contrast between 
the norms of war in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, respectively, turned out to be 
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palpable. In 1777, the Continental victory at Saratoga culminated in French recognition of and an 
alliance with the nascent Republic that proved critical to the success of the American Revolution. 
A century later, at the Battle of Bull Run, General Robert E. Lee won a comparable victory, 
which the Confederacy expected would elicit similar European recognition, a paramount early 
aim of the secessionists (pp. 209-210). Less than a decade later in Europe, Prussia demolished 
French forces at the 1870 Battle of Sedan, one of the most devastating pitched battles in history, 
culminating in the capture of Emperor Napoleon III and the surrender of hundreds of thousands 
of French soldiers (p. 208).  
By the latter nineteenth century, however, states and their populations ceased to accept 
the verdict of battle and its norms, such as the retreat rule (p. 230), chiefly because of changes in 
the stakes, on the one hand, and norms of political legitimacy, on the other (p. 215).  That is why, 
Whitman argues, neither the Union nor France, the conventional losers at Bull Run and Sedan, 
adhered to the old rules in connection with the Confederate and Prussian victories, respectively. 
Instead, they modified their tactics and initiated “irregular” techniques of warfare (pp. 208-09). 
Franc-tireurs evolved to resist Prussian forces (pp. 208-09). Similar tactics came to characterize 
the Civil War, culminating in the notorious scorched-earth campaign waged by General Sherman 
(pp. 210-11). It would be difficult to imagine a more stark contrast to the pitched battle. 
Earlier studies explain the collapse of pitched battle by focusing on military technology 
(the substitution of rifles for muskets) or the supposed decline of an eighteenth-century culture of 
chivalry among aristocratic combatants (p. 213). Recent scholarship and a growing body of 
evidence, however, demolish the former explanation. At the time, rifles evidently made pitched 
battles no less feasible (p. 217). As for the putative decline of an aristocratic culture of chivalry, 
the truth is to the contrary: “far from being the period when the chivalric, dueling idea of war 
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went into decline, [the nineteenth century] was the period when that idea was born and 
triumphed” (p. 216). Whitman stresses this (often misunderstood) point throughout The Verdict 
of Battle. The privilege to inflict violence, which dates to the Middle Ages and had traditionally 
distinguished the aristocracy, is the antithesis of a monarchical monopoly on legitimate violence 
(p. 138); and the latter is a sine qua non of pitched battle (pp. 19, 215-16, 226). The idea that 
eighteenth-century limits on war reflect aristocratic noblesse oblige is therefore not only a fiction 
of the Romantic era but “little short of perverse as a matter of historical interpretation” (p. 226). 
Pitched battles rather declined, Whitman argues, because of changes in war’s stakes and 
ideological dimensions. Once dominated by discrete claims to property or dynastic succession, 
its objectives increasingly became the pursuit of more intangible ideals: national unification, 
honor, and millenarian conceptions of warfare (p. 224). At the same time, the rise of 
republicanism eroded monarchical legitimacy (p. 236), leading to the advent of the standing 
army and citizen-soldiers and sounding the death knell for “[p]rincely warfare . . . fought by a 
paid, uniformed trained soldiery” (p. 236). These developments coincided, not coincidentally, 
with the ascendance of teleological theories of history promulgated by Hegel, Marx, and their 
intellectual heirs. Belief in a grand design or purpose to historical events, battles included, could 
not subsist with the belief that the verdict of battle depends on fortune (pp. 238, 242-43). Hence 
“[p]itched battle . . . lost its eighteenth-century juristic significance. No longer a wager turning 
on dynastic succession and property claims, it began to represent something much grander. It 
began to represent . . . the verdict of history” (p. 244). 
Is this narrative accurate? From the perspective of an international lawyer rather than a 
historian, I hesitate to venture a categorical answer. In general, however, Whitman’s lucid, 
forceful prose and assiduous research, including original translations of the French, German, and 
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Latin classics that inform his arguments, yield compelling arguments, and he generally preserves 
a laudable scholarly detachment, candidly acknowledging qualifications or limitations—although 
it may be that he sometimes elides “inconvenient evidence.”6 But for this reviewer, a historical 
critique would be largely hearsay. I will focus instead on the jurists, theologians, and other 
thinkers whose writings The Verdict of Battle analyzes, its characterization of certain legal and 
ethical concepts, its polemical facets, and its normative conclusions for the modern law of war.  
First, classics by Aquinas, Augustine, Grotius, Vattel, Pufendorf, and others suggest a 
more protean narrative than does The Verdict of Battle of the evolution of just war theory and 
international law—and of their influence on the comparatively recent emergence of a major 
humanitarian dimension to the law of war. The book tends to emphasize certain of their ideas 
and developments and deemphasize others, yielding a relatively seamless, coherent narrative, 
which, at times, obscures a more complex but balanced account. Modern just war theory and IHL 
emerged from multiple, and at times inconsistent, intellectual trends and antecedents.7 Pufendorf, 
for example, indeed wrote of battle as a “tacit contract of chance” (pp. 52, 77), as did Grotius 
(pp. 88-89). But Grotius also reflected at length on legitimate self-defense, the (just) causes of 
war, and (perhaps most germane here) the idea of moderation in war, to which he devoted much 
of the third volume of De Jure Belli ac Pacis.8 True, Grotius did not assert these ideas as positive 
international law. But early writers on what became the public international law of Europe and 
eventually the world, including Grotius, Gentili, and Spanish scholastics (Francisco de Vitoria, 
Francico Suárez, and others), drew a much less rigid distinction than many lawyers do today 
                                                
6 See, e.g., David A. Bell, Is War Civilized?, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 3, 2013. 
7 See, e.g., STEPHEN C. NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS 11, 96 (2005); James Turner Johnson, The Just 
War Idea: The State of the Question, SOC. PHIL & POL’Y, Jan. 2006, at 167, 168-71; WILLIAM V. O’BRIAN, THE 
CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED WAR 5, 11, 13 (1981).  
8 Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the 
Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 47, 61 (2009). 
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between positive legal, on the one hand, and ethical or theological, on the other, injunctions. 
Similarly, it is true that early and medieval theologians did not promulgate doctrines of just war 
intended mainly to punish evil (p. 103). Augustine and Aquinas indeed recognized that the 
vindication of property rights, among other causes, could be just (p. 106). But they also 
developed criteria (p. 101) that, for better or worse, serve as antecedents to modern debates 
about, for example, the legality or prudence of humanitarian intervention.  
It therefore goes too far, I think, to condemn as “mistaken” (p. 101) the modern focus on 
aspects of medieval just war theory and, latterly, the reflections of luminaries like Grotius, 
Gentili, and Pufendorf,9 as antecedents that might (or might not) helpfully inform debates in IHL 
today. It would certainly be anachronistic to acontextually compare the contemporaneous 
concerns of war at these earlier times to those in our own. But it does not follow that it is 
misguided to draw upon, perhaps marginal but nonetheless present, ideas that early writers 
developed and that have been adopted by or adapted to the humanitarian dimensions of modern 
IHL—even if those ideas were not (and I agree, they were not) their general or paramount focus. 
We must also take care to distinguish these theological jus ad bellum antecedents, and, 
centuries later, Immanuel Kant’s arguably more quixotic suggestions in Perpetual Peace,10 from 
the oft distinct sources of premodern jus in bello antecedents. The Verdict of Battle sometimes 
elides the distinction or ambiguously treats (and often critiques) the two as a homogenous 
tradition. It ascribes the revival of just war theory to Alfred Vanderpol, who evidently distorted 
early medieval just war theory into a quasi-pacifist doctrine in the early twentieth century (p. 
103). That is certainly unfortunate and, as Whitman stresses, misleading—although given the 
robust influence Vanderpol is said to have exerted on modern just war theory and international 
                                                
9 See, e.g., id. at 60-61 & nn. 81-86. 
10 IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE (1795). 
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law, it strikes me as odd that his works have not been translated into English to date. But at any 
rate, the “creation of a humanitarian law of war” (p. 101, emphasis added), the focus of modern 
IHL, should not be traced to Vanderpol and other early twentieth-century or interwar just war 
theorists who tried (with notoriously poor results) to adapt early scholastic ideas to their 
aspiration to produce a radically new jus ad bellum for international law. The origins and 
antecedents of the modern jus in bello, or IHL, lie far less in the foregoing strand of just war 
theory and far more in the creation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) after 
Solferino, the first Geneva Convention of 1864, President Lincoln’s promulgation of the Lieber 
Code during the Civil War, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, and other late nineteenth 
and early twentieth-century antecedents. To be sure, modern IHL draws upon some medieval just 
war concepts, such as, to cite one prominent example, the doctrine of double effect. But the 
common practice among contemporary writers of citing early theological, chivalric, and other 
constraints on war in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere serves principally, not to suggest the origins of 
modern IHL, still less that these constraints constituted premodern positive law, but rather to 
emphasize their historical and cultural ubiquity—that is, to show that war has always and 
everywhere been subject to norms that distinguish it from massacre (as Whitman indeed argues).    
As historical scholarship, The Verdict of Battle is compelling; as a polemic, less so. 
Perhaps the most troubling issue is Whitman’s foil: the “modern humanitarian” (passim). He 
does not define this person explicitly. Implicitly, it is equally difficult to know to whom it refers. 
The views ascribed to the modern humanitarian range broadly across the spectrum of opinions 
about the ancient and modern law of war and both the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. Modern 
humanitarians refer variously to just war theorists, lawyers, pacifists, human rights advocates, 
and others to whom Whitman ascribes flawed, naïve, anachronistic, or quixotic views.  
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Descriptively, for example, it is stated or implied that modern humanitarians believe that 
IHL applied to premodern wars (p. 195); anachronistically regard Frederick the Great’s seizure 
of Silesia as the paradigmatic act of illegal criminal aggression (passim); view war chiefly as “a 
species of crime” (pp. 54, 108-09); regard medieval and theological just war antecedents as “a 
primitive version of the modern humanitarian jus ad bellum, dedicated to the proposition that the 
law of war was a close cousin to the law of criminal prosecution” (p. 113); and therefore fail 
even to understand that “medieval just war theory was . . . not law in the modern sense at all, but 
counsel of conscience” (p. 103). Because of these supposed misapprehensions, Whitman writes 
that eighteenth-century pitched battles would surely sound “barbaric to modern humanitarians” 
(p. 99), no more than “senseless collective slaughter” (p. 46). Modern humanitarians, he thinks, 
would “find it difficult to grasp that eighteenth-century readers could have accepted . . . the law 
of succession as justification for . . . war” (p. 121).  
Normatively, “modern advocates of a humanitarian law of war” are said to endeavor 
quixotically “to construct a world of perfect justice or to impose standards of unimpeachably 
high conduct . . . [and] to limit war to the task of punishing or preventing evil” (p. 129). The 
lawyers among modern humanitarians thus insist on denouncing evil regimes and encourage 
intervention abroad to “run thugs out of power,” heedless of the dangers of failed states (pp. 254-
55). Emblematic of this modern humanitarianism, in Whitman’s view, is the recent promotion by 
international lawyers “of the [albeit aspirational] ‘responsibility to protect,’ which would oblige 
the international community to use coercive measures against evil regimes” (p. 255).11 
                                                
11 Even the most extreme version of this aspirational idea, which is far from a consensus ethically or among 
international lawyers, does not “oblige the international community to use coercive measures against evil regimes.” 
That is a mischaracterization. In fairness, however, it is true that some influential documents refer to a responsibility 
to protect and enumerate criteria for it redolent of those found in early just war theory. See SEC’Y-GEN.’S HIGH-
LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, CHALLENGES AND CHANGE, A MORE SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY 
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Assertions like these permeate The Verdict of Battle and could be multiplied many times 
over. But these quotations suffice to illustrate why they may well be unfair characterizations. It is 
doubtless true that some overzealous or misguided advocates of IHL or humanitarian ethics hold 
the beliefs or promote the normative ideals ascribed to the “modern humanitarian.” But they are 
the exception and not, as The Verdict of Battle suggests, the rule. Whitman also says candidly 
that his polemical target, other than military historians, is the international lawyer who allegedly 
fails to appreciate that the law of war is not fundamentally a “humanitarian enterprise, often 
close in spirit to criminal law,” (p. 9) and chiefly preoccupied with punishing evil. That target is 
largely a straw man. In general, neither modern just war theorists nor, and a fortiori, 
international lawyers—many of whom work alongside soldiers and military élites, advising 
combatants on the battlefield—fail to appreciate the political, strategic, and ethical complexity of 
modern war or think that the law of war is “all about punishing evil” (p. 113). Polemical 
characterization of this sort is unfortunate because it tarnishes Whitman’s sensible admonitions 
against, for example, politicians who favor foreign military adventures or seek regime change, 
lawyers who overzealously advocate military intervention, or those who regard war as a tool to 
remake the world in an ideological image. Whitman seems to have the Iraq War of 2003 in mind. 
I suspect that modern humanitarians would share his critiques of it. 
A more accurate portrayal of modern humanitarianism would be the ICRC. Henri 
Dunant, its founder, fully appreciated war’s inevitability. After Solferino, he sought to establish 
an organization and legal standards that, within the realistic and inevitable context of military 
necessity, could nonetheless mitigate superfluous harm by encouraging dynamics of reciprocity, 
                                                                                                                                                       
¶ 207 (2004). 
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drawing upon transcultural norms of the warrior’s honor,12 and emphasizing, as Telford Taylor 
insightfully observed, the psychological value of “the laws of war” insofar as they “diminish the 
corrosive effect of mortal combat on the participants.”13 The ICRC tellingly, as a matter of 
institutional mandate, avoids any characterization of particular wars as just or unjust. Indeed, its 
mandate is strikingly similar to the putatively more modest objective ascribed in The Verdict of 
Battle to eighteenth-century jurists: to “create a world in which sovereigns . . . at least refuse to 
behave like wild beasts, like Attila or Genghis” (p. 129). 
The Verdict of Battle concludes with a lament and some apparent nostalgia for the orderly 
pitched battles of the eighteenth century. Whitman critiques the reasons proffered by David Bell, 
Carl Schmitt, Michael Howard, Stephen Neff, and others (pp. 12-14) for the nature of eighteenth-
century pitched battle but seems substantially to share their account of its nature, legitimacy, and 
comparative gentility (pp. 160-61, 188, 252-53). He recognizes, of course, that contemporary 
circumstances and a “brutal disregard for the value of human life that we are no longer prepared 
to accept” (p. 253) render it impossible, even if it were desirable, to revive eighteenth-century 
norms of war. But he argues that while the “transformation [from war as civil justice . . . to war 
as necessity and ideology] has taken place for noble reasons,  . . . it has resulted in sprawling and 
amorphous wars and it has come at a high cost in human lives” (p. 250).  
This argument appears to be a variant on a familiar objection to IHL that is often traced 
to Clausewitz: that the most humane war is a brief one. IHL, it has often been said, by mitigating 
war’s horrors, ironically prolongs and exacerbates rather than limits war’s aggregate harms.14 
The Verdict of Battle, to my knowledge, is the first work of scholarship to advance this critique 
                                                
12 See generally MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE WARRIOR’S HONOR 109-63 (1999) 
13 TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 40 (1970). 
14 E.g., Roger Normand & Chris af Jochnick, The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of 
War, 35 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1994). 
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based on a sophisticated historical analysis. But the critique continues to suffer from a lack of 
empirical evidence. Whitman also argues that “[i]t is not a good thing if the humanitarian tone of 
our international law prevents us from cutting deals” (p. 257). Again, I tend to agree, but how 
often does it? 
Whitman’s (1) skepticism of regime change and the prudence or advisability of 
humanitarian intervention (except, he would allow, in cases of systematic atrocity on the order of 
Nazi Germany or the Rwandan genocide), (2) his remarks on the folly and futility of seeking to 
spread ideology through war, and (3) his criticism of the Manichean simplicity of viewing 
opposing belligerents as evil are all, in my view, sagacious. I also share his views that “[h]igh 
morality is an exceedingly treacherous foundation for the law of war” and that “[w]ars enter their 
most dangerous territory . . . when they aim to remake the world” (p. 251). But high morality is 
not the foundation of the modern law of war, and modern wars seldom seek to remake the world.  
The Verdict of Battle’s conclusions combine many sensible normative admonitions with 
often dubious descriptive contentions, for example, that “ever since 1863 and 1870 our wars 
have consistently ended up raising basic, revolutionary questions about the organization of 
society and the legitimacy of states” (p. 251). In fact, the vast majority of armed conflicts since 
World War II have been transnational, internal, or otherwise “irregular,” not clashes between 
states based on ideological legitimacy. And in the early twentieth century, neither the Spanish-
American nor the First World War, to cite two prominent examples, seem like particularly 
ideological conflicts about “the organization of society and the legitimacy of states.” Even during 
the Cold War, ideology served more as a pretext for geostrategic and security interests than the 
actual motivation for its “hot” wars. Most armed conflicts today tend to be about issues that do 
not differ much from those of the long eighteenth century: borders, resource control, modern 
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variants on dynastic succession, security, and so forth. (For all its prominence in recent history 
and the public imagination, the Iraq War of 2003 is not paradigmatic of modern wars.) 
The pitched battles and, in general, more confined wars of the eighteenth century were 
indeed more humane (if that means, essentially, limited and rule-governed) than epic, extended 
ideological wars, although the latter do not seem unique to modernity. Nor is it always easy to 
separate the two. The Crusades combined intense religious fervor and efforts to remake regions 
of the world to conform to medieval Christian ideals with mundane territorial claims and venal 
opportunities for looting and pillaging. One might also contrast the 1991 Iraq War, a brutal effort 
to vindicate a nonetheless plausible territorial claim to Kuwait by a functional monarch (and thus 
a war apparently similar to the eighteenth-century paradigm), with the far more humanely fought 
and consciously limited ouster of Iraq’s forces by collective military action in accordance with 
IHL—based in part on adherence to the jus ad bellum of the U.N. Charter. The Charter, tellingly, 
is not a pacifist instrument animated by a just war mandate to punish evil. Efficacy aside, it only 
prohibits, with ideological neutrality, “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state.”15 And today, unlike in the eighteenth-century, it is not just 
customary but, under the law of armed conflict, illegal to, for example, massacre retreating 
forces (pp. 178-79), summarily execute prisoners of war, or deny quarter to prisoners of war. 
Arguably, this reflects progress, not evidence that eighteenth-century wars were more civilized 
than what came before or after (pp. 129-30, 206, 250). To paraphrase Churchill, contemporary 
IHL, for all its faults, may be the worst law of war except for all the others we have tried. 
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15 U.N. CHARTER, Art. 2(4). 
